National Technical Reports Library

The National Technical Information Service acquires, indexes, abstracts, and archives the largest collection of U.S. government-sponsored technical reports in existence. The NTRL offers online, free and open access to these authenticated government technical reports. Technical reports and documents in its repository may be available online for free either from the issuing federal agency, the U.S. Government Publishing Office’s Federal Digital System website, or through search engines.

Details

Cause-Defense Approach to the Understanding and Analysis of Common Cause Failures.

NUREGCR5460

Publication Date	1990
Personal Author	Paula, H.; Parry, G.; Campbell, D.; Mitchell, D.; Rasmuson, D.
Page Count	144
Abstract	The report presents the results of research to develop a new methodology for common cause failure analysis and prevention. Common cause failures are defined as those caused by single events that can make redundant components unavailable, thus compromising the reliability of redundant trains of equipment. Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and nuclear power plant (NPP) operations have demonstrated that CCF events are often major contributors to the potential risk posed at such plants. Over the years, qualitative and quantitative analysis methods have been developed to improve CCF analysis. However, these methodologies have not explicitly accounted for the impact of plant-specific defenses, such as design features and operational and maintenance policies, in reducing the likelihood of failures at NPPs. The research documented in the report describes a cause-defense methodology for CCF analysis and prevention to help correct this deficiency. The report discusses the development of (1) procedures for identifying the potential for CCF events at individual NPPs and (2) cause-defense matrices for analyzing CCF events. New concepts and more precise definitions are introduced to enhance CCF terminology and interpretation of historical event data.
Keywords	Nuclear power plants Reactor components Failure mode analysis Probability Mathematical models Requirements Maintenance Policies Common cause failures Dependent failures
Source Agency	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTIS Subject Category	77H - Reactor Engineering & Nuclear Power Plants 97Q - Selected Studies In Nuclear Technology
Corporate Authors	JBF Associates, Inc., Knoxville, TN.; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. Div. of Systems Research.; Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM.; NUS Corp., Gaithersburg, MD.
Supplemental Notes	Also available from Supt. of Docs. Also pub. as Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM. rept. no. SAND89-2368. Prepared in cooperation with Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM., and NUS Corp., Gaithersburg, MD. Sponsored by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. Div. of Systems Research.
Document Type	Technical Report
Title Note	Technical rept.
NTIS Issue Number	199014

Cause-Defense Approach to the Understanding and Analysis of Common Cause Failures.

Cause-Defense Approach to the Understanding and Analysis of Common Cause Failures.
NUREGCR5460

Publication Date	1990
Personal Author	Paula, H.; Parry, G.; Campbell, D.; Mitchell, D.; Rasmuson, D.
Page Count	144
Abstract	The report presents the results of research to develop a new methodology for common cause failure analysis and prevention. Common cause failures are defined as those caused by single events that can make redundant components unavailable, thus compromising the reliability of redundant trains of equipment. Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and nuclear power plant (NPP) operations have demonstrated that CCF events are often major contributors to the potential risk posed at such plants. Over the years, qualitative and quantitative analysis methods have been developed to improve CCF analysis. However, these methodologies have not explicitly accounted for the impact of plant-specific defenses, such as design features and operational and maintenance policies, in reducing the likelihood of failures at NPPs. The research documented in the report describes a cause-defense methodology for CCF analysis and prevention to help correct this deficiency. The report discusses the development of (1) procedures for identifying the potential for CCF events at individual NPPs and (2) cause-defense matrices for analyzing CCF events. New concepts and more precise definitions are introduced to enhance CCF terminology and interpretation of historical event data.
Keywords	Nuclear power plants Reactor components Failure mode analysis Probability Mathematical models Requirements Maintenance Policies Common cause failures Dependent failures
Source Agency	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTIS Subject Category	77H - Reactor Engineering & Nuclear Power Plants 97Q - Selected Studies In Nuclear Technology
Corporate Authors	JBF Associates, Inc., Knoxville, TN.; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. Div. of Systems Research.; Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM.; NUS Corp., Gaithersburg, MD.
Supplemental Notes	Also available from Supt. of Docs. Also pub. as Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM. rept. no. SAND89-2368. Prepared in cooperation with Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM., and NUS Corp., Gaithersburg, MD. Sponsored by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. Div. of Systems Research.
Document Type	Technical Report
Title Note	Technical rept.
NTIS Issue Number	199014