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Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq.

ADA499691

Publication Date	2008
Personal Author	Brown, D. M.
Page Count	69
Abstract	Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine emphasizes the importance of unity of effort among all agencies involved in a COIN fight. That doctrine stresses that unity of effort is best achieved by consolidating all efforts under a single chain of command or leader. When multiple agencies pursue differing agendas, unity of effort suffers. Interagency coordination and synchronization issues at the highest levels of the U.S. Government continue to affect the war in Iraq. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS) have overlapping responsibilities for Iraq. The President has issued various National Security Directives regarding Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) in Iraq and which department is responsible for what, but the issue is far from being resolved. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are the tool this monograph will use to use to explore the issues hampering the interagency process in Iraq. The mission of PRTs in Iraq is to act as a U.S.-led, civil- military effort to help Iraq's provincial and local governments govern effectively and deliver essential services. The U.S. Government faced a similar problem during the Vietnam War. As the Vietnam War grew in scope and scale, the U.S. Government faced the challenge of coordinating the efforts of all of the agencies involved in the war. After a number of unsuccessful attempts by several Presidents, President Johnson established the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program. CORDS consolidated all efforts, civilian and military, conventional and COIN, under a single chain of command and a single leader. CORDS is generally regarded as a successful program in spite of the Vietnam War's final outcome. The lessons learned in the development of CORDS can be applied to the current situation in Iraq. The author recommends that the U.S. Government adopt a CORDS-like approach to Iraq and consolidate SRO under the DoD rather than the DoS to achieve true unity of effort.
Keywords	Community relations Iraqi war Vietnam war Stabilization Interagency coordination Counterinsurgency Civic action Local government South vietnam Department of state Rural areas Civil affairs Construction Government(Foreign) Leadership Lessons learned Department of defense Military history Cords(Civil operations and rural development support program) Sro(Stability and reconstruction operations) Prt(Provincial reconstruction teams) Stability operations Unity of effort Chain of command Johnson lyndon b
Source Agency	Non Paid ADAS
Corporate Authors	Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Document Type	Technical Report
Title Note	Monograph.
NTIS Issue Number	200921

Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq.

Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq.
ADA499691

Publication Date	2008
Personal Author	Brown, D. M.
Page Count	69
Abstract	Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine emphasizes the importance of unity of effort among all agencies involved in a COIN fight. That doctrine stresses that unity of effort is best achieved by consolidating all efforts under a single chain of command or leader. When multiple agencies pursue differing agendas, unity of effort suffers. Interagency coordination and synchronization issues at the highest levels of the U.S. Government continue to affect the war in Iraq. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS) have overlapping responsibilities for Iraq. The President has issued various National Security Directives regarding Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) in Iraq and which department is responsible for what, but the issue is far from being resolved. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are the tool this monograph will use to use to explore the issues hampering the interagency process in Iraq. The mission of PRTs in Iraq is to act as a U.S.-led, civil- military effort to help Iraq's provincial and local governments govern effectively and deliver essential services. The U.S. Government faced a similar problem during the Vietnam War. As the Vietnam War grew in scope and scale, the U.S. Government faced the challenge of coordinating the efforts of all of the agencies involved in the war. After a number of unsuccessful attempts by several Presidents, President Johnson established the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program. CORDS consolidated all efforts, civilian and military, conventional and COIN, under a single chain of command and a single leader. CORDS is generally regarded as a successful program in spite of the Vietnam War's final outcome. The lessons learned in the development of CORDS can be applied to the current situation in Iraq. The author recommends that the U.S. Government adopt a CORDS-like approach to Iraq and consolidate SRO under the DoD rather than the DoS to achieve true unity of effort.
Keywords	Community relations Iraqi war Vietnam war Stabilization Interagency coordination Counterinsurgency Civic action Local government South vietnam Department of state Rural areas Civil affairs Construction Government(Foreign) Leadership Lessons learned Department of defense Military history Cords(Civil operations and rural development support program) Sro(Stability and reconstruction operations) Prt(Provincial reconstruction teams) Stability operations Unity of effort Chain of command Johnson lyndon b
Source Agency	Non Paid ADAS
Corporate Authors	Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Document Type	Technical Report
Title Note	Monograph.
NTIS Issue Number	200921