Publication Date |
2007 |
Personal Author |
Scott, W. A.; Prinzbach, I. R.; Bartoszek, T. S.; Henry, J. W.; Hollister, P. A. |
Page Count |
34 |
Abstract |
This report discusses the execution and overall management of the Warstopper Program to satisfy requirements for sudden and sustained increases in production (surge and sustainment) of selected critical industrial and medical items. 'War stopper' items include nerve agent antidote auto-injectors; chemical protective overgarments and gloves; meals ready to eat; tray pack rations; combat boots, including cold weather boots; and barrier materials. Demand for these items was high in wartime but declined rapidly in peacetime. The Under Secretary for Acquisition in September 1992 stated that Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) would be the principal agent for the Warstopper Program. Shortly thereafter, Congress created a separate Warstopper budget line to fund the preservation of critical industrial capabilities for selected items. DLA's Warstopper Program generally has been successful in providing a stable industrial base for selected Warstopper items managed by the Agency. DLA increased industry's capacity to provide surge and sustainment of selected Warstopper items, such as chemical gloves and meals, ready to eat. However, DLA included items in the program that did not meet its criteria. As a result, the DLA may have used scarce Warstopper funds for projects that should not have been included in the Warstopper Program and may have overlooked more deserving projects. The Inspector General, DoD recommends that the Director, Defense Logistics Agency require the Warstopper Program Manager to clearly identify specific criteria for including commercial medical data and licenses, specify the contents of the Program Description and Approval Document (a proposal to include a particular item), provide guidelines for calculating the potential return on investment associated with the acquisition of a prospective item, and formally document lessons learned. A review of the Managers' Internal Control Program did not identify any material management control weaknesses. |
Keywords |
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Source Agency |
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Corporate Authors |
Department of Defense, Washington, DC. Office of the Inspector General. |
Document Type |
Technical Report |
Title Note |
Final rept. |
NTIS Issue Number |
200802 |