| Abstract |
This essay presents the presumed thoughts and ruminations of Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian military strategist, on an article by Bernard Brodie entitled 'On Nuclear Weapons: Utility in Nonuse.' Clausewitz comments on each of four points made by Brodie in his article. The first point is that nuclear weapons deter war between the great powers simply because they exist. Clausewitz agrees with Brodie, but says his rationale is flawed. The key to why the statement is true is that the great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, subscribe to two points that Clausewitz makes in his famous book, 'On War': (1) the best strategy is always to be very strong, and (2) the decisive importance of relative strength increases the closer one approaches a state of balance in all factors. The second of Brodie's points is that if war between the great powers is to occur, nuclear weapons make it far more likely that the war will be a limited war and not, as Clausewitz has called it, an absolute war. Clausewitz says his thoughts are aligned with Brodie's on this point, and that recent events in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan would lead one to believe that the intellect of those in charge at the time resulted in a decision to avoid direct confrontation with the other great power, or 'war is the realm of uncertainty dominated by the power of the intellect.' Brodie's third point is that military men are incapable of making objective decisions regarding the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy because their training has made them insensitive to the issues involved. Clausewitz says he does not claim that major military developments should be a matter for purely military opinion, rather that policy makers and military officials should maintain counsel with each other. Brodie's fourth point is that the use of nuclear weapons is a political issue, not a military issue. Clausewitz concurs, saying that 'without a political end, war becomes pointless.'. |
